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SUBSIDIZING INCREASED EMPLOYMENT FOR THE URBAN POOR: 
WHAT LABOR MARKET PROBLEMS MIGHT JUSTIFY IT?
TIMOTHY J. BARTIK
1. Introduction
Current U.S. political fashion calls for pushing all the poor into jobs immediately. The 
neoliberal approach is to do so through various sorts of subsidies for increased employment of 
the poor, ranging from public service jobs, subsidies for private employers who hire the poor, 
and subsidies for the wages the poor receive. Moderate conservatives sometimes also back this 
approach, but more hardline conservatives simply want to cutoff welfare benefits outright and 
let the poor find their own way in the labor market. Finally, some liberals believe that the 
whole approach of aggressively substituting jobs for welfare could make the poor and their 
children worse off.
This paper summarizes the specific problems in labor markets that might justify a 
government policy of targeting the poor for special assistance to increase their employment or 
wages. I will identify specific "market failures "-failures of the private market to achieve 
socially optimal results-in labor markets that might reduce the employment and wages of the 
poor from what would be socially optimal. Among the factors that commonly cause private 
markets to fail are: external benefits or costs to other groups that are not taken into account by 
parties to market transactions; imperfect information; discrimination; distortion of prices so 
that they do not reflect marginal costs of production and marginal benefits to consumers. In 
addition, I will consider "market failure" to include the failure of private markets, even if 
efficient, to achieve a socially desirable income distribution.
Table 1
LIST OF POSSIBLE LABOR MARKET FAILURES THAT MIGHT JUSTIFY
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 
TO INCREASE THE EMPLOYMENT OR WAGES OF THE POOR
Employment may be more effective redistributional method 
than just giving the poor money.
Jobs may provide large economic benefits to the poor, and jobs 
that pay higher wage premiums may provide particularly large 
economic benefits to the poor.
The market may fail to recognize the true productivity of the 
poor.
The market may fail to provide the poor with sufficient human 
capital.
Table 1 lists the labor market failures I will discuss. For each market failure, I will 
discuss the evidence that we have and need to have to evaluate its importance. I will also 
discuss the policy implications of each market failure. The existence of a private market 
failure does not necessarily mean that government intervention will improve things. But 
identification of such a market failure at least suggests what problem government intervention 
might attempt to address.
Beyond the labor market problems that are the focus of this paper, there may also be 
social "externalities" from greater employment of the poor-external benefits for other groups 
in society from reduced crime, lower welfare costs, better parenting of kids, improved 
neighborhood quality, and improvement in the "image" of some metropolitan areas. These 
external benefits may be important. If the benefits are large, there is greater economic
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rationale for subsidizing the employment of the poor. There may also be greater political
support for subsidizing the employment of the poor if such benefits can be demonstrated. I 
Despite their importance, I will not discuss these external benefits much here, due to 
limitations of time and space and a belief that understanding problems in the labor markets 
facing the poor is a necessary first step.
2. Employment vs. Income Transfers for Redistribution
Whether it is more desirable to help the poor through increasing earnings or non- 
earnings income raises difficult ethical issues of mutual obligations between the poor and the 
non-poor. Do the poor deserve unconditional assistance from the non-poor, to be used as the 
poor best see fit? Or should that assistance be conditioned on the poor making some 
contribution in return for government assistance, such as through providing work?
Rather than addressing these difficult ethical questions, I want to ask a narrower 
question: Is helping the poor through employment assistance more effective in some sense in 
redistributing long-run economic and social well-being towards the poor? At least part of the 
social support for employment approaches to poverty rests on the implicit belief that such 
programs, if successful, may enable individuals to permanently escape poverty on the basis of 
their own earnings. The American public wants the poor to work. I suspect this support for 
work would not be as strong if the poor's employment must be continually subsidized through 
various government transfers. Escaping poverty through one's own earnings seems likely to 
enhance one's sense of independence, self-esteem, and social reputation. The individual's 
"social income" in this case is probably greater than achieving the same monetary income
4through income transfers from the government or private charity. The old cliche is that it is 
better to teach someone to fish than to give them a fish. Do employment approaches to helping 
the poor seem to have any promise for helping the poor to permanently escape poverty 
through their own earnings? Do these programs "teach fishing" or just give away fish?
Research on local labor markets suggests that short-run employment experiences can 
permanently affect labor market outcomes. The evidence suggests that a one-time shock to 
local labor demand-for example, a shock that increases a metropolitan area's employment 
growth for one time period only, but permanently increases the metropolitan area's 
employment from what it otherwise would be-increases the local labor force participation rate 
for at least eight years after the shock and perhaps permanently (Bartik, 1993b). 1 Local labor 
demand shocks also appear to allow individuals to move up to better paying occupations, and 
stay in those jobs for at least eight years after the shock. These effects of growth on 
occupational upgrading are particularly strong for those with less education and African- 
American (Bartik, 1991). This evidence from local labor markets can only be partially 
convincing, however, because this research only shows that short-run demand shocks have 
long-run effects on local labor market average outcomes. This research does not directly show 
that the short-run employment experiences of individuals have long-run consequences for those 
same individuals.
There is some direct evidence of long-term effects on earnings of individuals' 
employment experiences (Osterman, 1988; Ellwood, 1982; Bartik, in process). Osterman finds
1 This assertion is challenged in a well-known paper by Blanchard and Katz (1992), but re- 
estimates suggest that their conclusion is due to limitations in their model's specification 
(Bartik, 1993b).
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that being unemployed more than 21 weeks reduces an individual's earnings by around 70
percent more than five years later. Ell wood finds that 26 extra weeks of unemployment for a 
young person reduces their wages by ten to 20 percent at least three years later, and perhaps as 
long as ten years later. My own current research finds that, for a sample of individuals whose 
initial family income was around the poverty line, ten percent more work hours in a particular 
year increases their earnings ten years later by almost five percent.
My own recent research also addresses the issue of whether the long-term effects of 
employment experience depend on the type of employment experience, in particular what 
wage this employment pays. The answer is that it does matter-employment experience this 
year at a low wage will not increase earnings as much ten years later as employment at a high 
wage would. However, even employment experience at a very low wage is associated with 
significantly higher earnings ten years later.
One criticism of all these studies is that the correlation between an individual's 
employment this year and their economic fortunes some years later does not reflect causation, 
but rather unobserved characteristics of individuals that affect their economic success in both 
years. All three studies attempt to control for observed prior characteristics of individuals that 
might affect their earnings, but it is difficult to adequately control for the many unobserved 
characteristics that also affect individuals' economic success.
The possible long-run effects of greater employment experience seems consistent with 
the results of experiments with job training programs and welfare-to-work programs. 
According to Greenberg and Wiseman's analysis of 13 welfare-to-work experiments, "[s]ome 
of the measured impacts...do appear to decay, but others seem to persist or even grow over
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time." (Greenberg and Wiseman, 1992). Greenberg and Wiseman emphasize that most of
these programs only followed impacts for a few years, making it difficult to be definitive 
about time trends. One of the few employment program studies that did provide really long- 
term follow-up is Couch's analysis of the long-term effects on AFDC moms of the supported 
work program (Couch, 1992). This program, which provided structured employment 
experiences and counseling for AFDC moms and other groups, was evaluated by comparing 
the earnings of program participants with the earnings of a randomly chosen control group. 
Couch found that supported work increased AFDC moms' earnings in 1979, the first post- 
program year, by $248 compared to the control group. Good data were not available for 1980 
or 1981. In subsequent years, supported work participation in the 1975-78 period is estimated 
to have increased the earnings of AFDC moms by $437 in 1982, $456 in 1983, $525 in 1984,
$413 in 1985, and $375 in 1986. There is no real sign of decay in the earnings effects of
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supported work even eight years after the program was conducted.
As the supported work results indicate, the average long-term effects of increased 
employment through employment and training programs, although statistically significant, are 
usually quite modest in dollar value. Similar modest dollar effects are found for the welfare- 
to-work experiments (Greenberg and Wiseman, 1992; Gueron and Pauly, 1991) or the 
evaluation of the federal Job Training Partnership Act (Bloom et al, 1994) An important open 
question is whether these modest average effects are due to large effects for a few persons, or 
small effects for a few persons. If these programs at least produce large dollar effects for a 
few persons, perhaps these programs do have the potential to help at least some individuals to 
"learn how to fish." The challenge to policymakers and research is then to identify what
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combination of program characteristics and personal characteristics can result in long-run
success. If this can be done, then such programs may deserve to be pursued. Society might 
wish to pursue such programs even if on a benefit-cost basis, it might be economically more 
efficient to just pay out welfare benefits. Society quite properly might regard an increase in 
income for the poor due to long-run earnings increases to be more socially valuable than 
income that is dependent on government transfers.
3. Special Benefits of More and Better Jobs for the Poor
The "person-on-the-street" would probably regard it as obvious that being employed 
provides benefits over being unemployed, and that some jobs are better than others. 
Conventional economic theory, however, holds that in a perfect market the wage paid to the 
last person hired is exactly equal to their "reservation wage," that is the value of their time in 
whatever alternative they have to working. In addition, conventional economic theory holds 
that all wage differences across jobs will either reflect differences in worker quality or 
differences in the amenities of jobs.
Recently developed "efficiency wage models" provide theoretical support for the belief 
that market wages may exceed reservation wages, and market wages on some jobs may exceed 
wages on other jobs even without differences in worker skills or job amenities. Efficiency 
wage models assume that higher market wages may increase worker productivity. Productivity 
may increase for many reasons: higher wages provide a motive for workers to want to work 
hard to keep their jobs, even if employers find it difficult to detect shirking; higher wages 
result in a better applicant pool and reduce the burden on imperfect employer screening to pick
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out quality workers; higher wages may reduce the quit rate and hence reduce turnover costs
for employers; particular wage levels or differentials across jobs may be perceived as "fairer" 
by workers and increase worker morale and effort.
A number of studies have provided empirical support for efficiency wage models. 
These studies have shown that wages differ across industries by large amounts, often by as 
much as 20 to 30 percent. Higher wage premium industries seem to have lower quit rates, 
suggesting that the higher wage rate is not simply a compensating differential for poor 
working conditions. Other studies have challenged the efficiency wage model. It is inherently 
difficult to prove or disprove whether wage differentials across different industries or firms 
are due to difficult-to-observe efficiency wage considerations or instead due to other 
unobservables, such as job amenities (Katz and Summers, 1989).
Efficiency wage models may provide a rationale for government intervention to change 
the number and types of jobs, and may provide a rationale for special assistance targeted at the 
number and types of jobs held by the poor. If the wage rate on additional jobs created exceeds 
the reservation wage of workers who might be hired for that job, there is an economic 
rationale for subsidizing that job creation. If wages on some jobs provide economic surpluses 
to workers that exceed such surpluses on other jobs, there is an economic rationale for 
subsidizing a shift in the industry mix towards these higher surplus industries. If the 
reservation wages of the poor are particularly low, then there is an economic rationale for 
subsidizing job creation targeted at the poor.
The little direct evidence we have on reservation wages does not suggest that the 
differential between market wages and reservation wages is particularly large for
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disadvantaged groups. Holzer, for example, found that black youths and white youths have
similar reservation wages, even though the market wages in jobs actually obtained by black 
youth are on average lower than in the jobs obtained by white youth (Holzer, 1986). The 
average reservation wages of the unemployed do appear to be lower in high unemployment 
local labor markets, dropping by one to two percent for every one percent increase in the local 
unemployment rate (Jones, 1989). This suggests that there may be an economic rationale for 
policies that would create jobs in high unemployment local labor markets. All of these 
reservation wage studies could be criticized on the grounds that it is very difficult for 
individuals to clearly state what wage is the lowest wage at which they would be willing to 
accept a job. People may state the wage they expect or want instead of the lowest wage they 
would be willing to accept.
Indirect evidence from studies of the effects of local growth, and studies of guaranteed 
employment programs, could suggest that the gap between market wages and reservation 
wages may be higher for disadvantaged groups, but this evidence also has other 
interpretations. The overwhelming majority of studies find that the short-run effects of shocks 
to national or local labor demand disproportionately benefit blacks and the less educated 
(Bartik, 1993a, 1993b provides reviews). Boston's experience during the "Massachusetts 
miracle" of the early and mid-1980s is instructive. From 1980 to the height of the Boston 
boom in 1988, poverty rates among black families in Boston dropped from 29 percent to 13 
percent, whereas black poverty rates increased in other central cities. White poverty rates also 
dropped, but not nearly as much, from 11 percent to six percent (Osterman, 1991).
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Studies of a job guarantee program for disadvantaged youth, the Youth Incentive 
Entitlement Pilot Projects (YIEPP) program, also shows a large responsiveness of 
disadvantaged groups to changes in economic opportunities. The YIEPP program, conducted 
from 1978 to 1981 in four cities, provided guaranteed part-time school-year and full-time 
summer jobs, at the minimum wage, to all disadvantaged 16-19 years old who stayed in school 
and met academic and job performance standards. Of those eligible for the program, a higher 
percentage of black youth than of white youth participated (63 percent versus 22 percent). 
During the program period, the employment rate for young disadvantaged blacks in the 
demonstration cities increased to a level similar to that of young disadvantaged whites, 
whereas typically the employment rate of disadvantaged black youths is much lower than that 
of whites. (Farkas et al, 1982).
Different interpretations can be given to these findings. One interpretation is that the 
reservation wages of disadvantaged groups are relatively low compared to their market wages. 
During normal unemployment rate periods, disadvantaged groups are rationed out of jobs they 
are capable of taking. An alternative interpretation is that labor markets in fact clear, without a 
large gap between reservation wages and market wages. However, disadvantaged groups may 
have a much higher elasticity of labor supply in response to slight changes in wages and 
working conditions. The debate between these two interpretations may seem academic, but is 
quite crucial for policy. If the latter interpretation is correct, and labor markets in fact clear, 
then increases in the take home pay of the poor due to measures such as the earned income tax 
credit are likely to increase the employment of the poor, because many more poor will seek 
jobs and find them. On the other hand, if the former interpretation is correct, and labor
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markets fail to clear, then such labor supply measures will need to be accompanied by some 
sort of boost to labor demand.
Under either interpretation, boosting overall labor demand would increase the 
employment of the poor, as this would likely boost both employment opportunities and wages 
for the poor. But policymakers considering a boost to overall labor demand would have to 
consider the potential adverse effects of lower unemployment rates on inflation and worker 
productivity. Policies that attempted to target increased labor demand towards the poor would 
be less likely to cause inflationary pressures. But the design of such policies would have to 
consider that employers may attach a stigma to being a member of some disadvantaged group, 
and be less likely to hire them (Burtless, 1985). We need to consider why employers may be 
less likely to hire the poor, a subject to which I now turn.
4. Poor Information and Discrimination May Lead Businesses to Fail to Recognize the 
True Productivity of the Poor
The evidence suggests that many businesses have considerable difficulty in 
accurately identifying employees who will be consistently productive. A recent study by 
Bishop, based upon a survey of members of the National Federation of Independent Business, 
finds that "Managers of small and medium firms were very often unpleasantly surprised by the 
performance of new hires. After six months on the job, more than one-quarter of new hires 
were producing less than 75 percent of what was anticipated when they were hired." (Bishop, 
1993, p. 336). These hiring problems happen in part because many of the factors that 
influence productivity are hard to measure before hiring. For example, Bishop found that an 
employee's "work habits," "people skills," and "learning ability" helped predict productivity
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and worker turnover. However, these factors did not help the employee predict the 
productivity of the employee before hiring.
Faced with quite imperfect information, employers try to use methods of hiring that 
will increase their ability to get workers with higher quality levels of these intangible factors. 
Many small and medium-sized employers do much of their hiring through recommendations 
from employees or friends of the employer. This practice, while it seems to be effective in 
increasing the average productivity level of those hired (Bishop, 1993), of course makes it 
more difficult for groups with less "job contacts," such as the poor or minorities, to get access 
to jobs. In addition, many employers are increasingly doing their hiring through temporary 
help agencies, which allows the employer more leeway in trying out new employees before 
making a hiring decision.
Another employer response to imperfect information is to discriminate against black or 
lower-class jobseekers, based on preconceptions about the likely productivity of such 
jobseekers. Kirschenman and Neckerman's interviews with 185 Chicago employers give some 
insight into employers' rationales for such discrimination. According to one Chicago 
manufacturer interviewed, "I would in all honesty probably say there is some [discrimination 
against blacks] among most employers. I think one of the reasons, in all honesty, is because 
we've had bad experience in that sector, and believe me, I've tried. And as I say, if I 
fmd-whether he's black or white, if he's good and, you know, we'll hire him. We are not 
shutting out any black specifically. But I will say that our experience factor has been bad. 
We've had more bad black employees over the years than we had good" (Kirschenman and 
Neckerman, 1991, p. 212). In addition to race, employers sometimes also discriminate based
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on social class, neighborhood, and gender. According to another Chicago employer, "We have
some black women here, but they're not inner city. They're from suburbs and...I think they're 
a little bit more willing to give it a shot, you know, I mean they're a little bit more willing 
[than black men] to give a day's work for a day's pay." (p. 217)
In addition to such interview studies, there is now some more direct evidence of racial 
discrimination in hiring, beyond the well-known indirect evidence from studies showing that 
white and minority wage rates and earnings differ after controlling for observed personal 
characteristics. Several "audit" studies suggest that black or Hispanic job seekers are less 
likely to get a job offer than are similar white job seekers. In these audit surveys, matched 
white and minority "testers" were recruited, given similar fake resumes, and sent to the same 
firm to apply for the same advertised job. In the Washington, D.C. study, in 19 percent of the 
cases the white "tester" was offered the job whereas the black "tester" was offered the job six 
percent of the time. In Chicago, the white "tester" was offered the job ten percent of the time, 
compared to five percent of the time for the black tester (Fix and Struyk, 1992). Similar 
differential treatment of white versus Hispanic "testers" was found in similar audits of 
employer hiring behavior in Chicago and San Diego. In contrast, an audit study of Denver did 
not find any evidence of employer discrimination against black or Hispanic "testers" in favor 
of whites. It seems that overt racial discrimination in hiring may vary quite a bit from one 
metropolitan area to another. These differences could reflect differences in employer 
preconceptions about the likely productivity of different racial groups, perhaps based on the 
character of the local labor markets, or perhaps based on differences in the "culture" of 
employers in various labor markets.
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One policy implication of these findings is that we may need to figure out more 
creative ways of dealing with employer discrimination against minorities. Using "testers" can 
perhaps provide objective evidence of racial discrimination, at least at large companies that 
make many hiring decisions. But if discrimination is at least in part motivated by imperfect 
employer information about job seekers, policies that provide employers with better 
information on disadvantaged job-seekers also seem needed. Policies that force or even 
subsidize employers to hire the disadvantaged may face significant problems if employers 
perceive such policies as likely to lead to hiring of less productive employees. For example, an 
experiment with wage subsidies for welfare recipients found that welfare recipients who were 
urged to inform employers (accurately) that if they were hired the employer could claim a tax 
credit for hiring a welfare recipient, were significantly less likely to be hired than a randomly 
chosen control group of welfare recipients that was not so urged (13 percent hire rate for the 
"advertised wage subsidy" group versus 21 percent for the control group) (Burtless, 1985). 
One interpretation of this result is that employers believed welfare recipients would be less 
productive, and therefore discriminated against job seekers who revealed their welfare 
recipiency status.
A number of employment/training programs for the poor are making some attempt to 
address these problems with poor employer information on jobseekers. Many local Job 
Training Partnership Act agencies employ "job developers" who seek to place JTPA graduates 
with area employers, particularly JTPA graduates who are eligible for "on-the-job training" 
wage subsidies to employers for the first six months of hiring. These job developers frequently 
work closely with employers in trying to screen JTPA graduates to make sure that employers
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know the strengths and weaknesses of who they are hiring. The much acclaimed "America
Works" program in New York City, a private for-profit agency which has a performance 
based contract to place welfare recipients in jobs, also has job developers who seek to reassure 
employers about the quality of those disadvantaged persons they hire. In addition, the very 
brief one-week "training" approach of America Works bounces from the program any welfare 
recipient who shows up late for any training session. This simple policy also helps increase the 
quality of persons referred by America Works to employers, although it also at the same time 
makes it more likely that they would have succeeded on their own. Finally, Cleveland is 
currently developing an initiative under which disadvantaged job seekers would receive help 
from a for-profit temporary help agency set up by the Cleveland Urban League. This for- 
profit agency would have strong incentives to work closely with employers to assure 
reasonable quality of disadvantaged persons who are hired through the agency, and would give 
employers a chance to assess a disadvantaged worker's productivity before making a 
permanent hiring commitment.
The issue with all these policy initiatives is whether they can provide sufficiently 
valuable information to employers about disadvantaged workers to significantly change 
employers' hiring decisions in favor of at least some disadvantaged persons. Some suggestive 
evidence so far comes from the National JTPA evaluation (Bloom et al, 1994). This 
evaluation found that OJT, which emphasizes the job development aspect of job training, had 
significant impacts on the earnings of adult JTPA participants compared to a randomly-chosen 
control group of non-JTPA participants. JTPA participants in classroom training, on the other 
hand, did not show significant earnings increases compared to the control group. In addition,
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the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation's evaluation of California's welfare to
work program found that one county, Riverside County, appears to have had far greater 
effects on participant earnings than the other 5 counties participating in the experiment 
(Friedlander et al, 1993). One factor that appears to differentiate Riverside County from the 
other experimental counties is its much more aggressive use of job developers. This may mean 
that Riverside County does a better job of providing employers with accurate information on 
the welfare recipients they are being asked to hire.
5. Worker Turnover, Poor Information, and Inadequate Resources Lead to Insufficient 
Investment in the Human Capital of the Poor
Economic theory suggests several reasons why there might be insufficient investment in 
the human capital of the poor. First, because of high expected worker turnover among 
disadvantaged workers, firms may be reluctant to invest much resources in training the poor. 
The social loss from this lack of business-supported training is particularly great if the training 
would have been for skills that would be generally applicable to a number of jobs. Second, 
both employers and workers might have insufficient evidence on the benefits and costs of 
training-what it would do to productivity and wages. Third, a poor individual will not be able 
to finance much extensive training on their own.
In part because of these problems, governments in the U.S. invest extensively in 
elementary and secondary education, community colleges, and colleges and universities. Such 
educational institutions of course do provide many skills that are valuable in the labor market. 
But school-based education may be only an imperfect substitute for job training with a heavy 
firm influence. Job training that has extensive firm control or input can be more attuned to the
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skills and technologies that firms actually use. Job training that is on a work site or organized 
by an employer will, from a worker's perspective, probably seem more likely to be relevant to 
their future economic success, so workers may be more motivated to participate in and work 
hard at such training. Finally, firms may have some institutional advantages over schools in 
delivering training that is immediately productive in the workplace. The marketplace puts 
pressure on firms to be flexible in how they run training programs, and gives firms and their 
workers an incentive to run training in a high quality manner.
The counter-argument to this position is that, beyond the academic basics of reading 
and math and socialization that schools and families are supposed to impart, worker 
productivity could mainly depend either on skills specific to one firm or on the quality of the 
match between the worker and the firm, not on general skills that firms might teach. If this is 
true, subsidizing firms to do training could be a mistake. We would expect firms on their own 
to have good incentives to do firm-specific training, as this training will not make workers 
more attractive to other firms and encourage turnover. If productivity depends a great deal on 
the quality of the worker-firm match, then worker turnover is efficient because it will 
gradually lead to more productive matches between firms and workers. According to a leading 
labor economist, James Heckman, "Job shopping promotes wage growth. Turnover is another 
form of investment not demonstrably less efficient than youth apprenticeships." (Heckman, 
1993)
The empirical evidence on job training, worker turnover, and the disadvantaged 
suggests the following:
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1. A great deal of firm-based training is going on. In large U.S. firms, 1.8 percent 
of the wage bill is spent on formal training programs (Lynch, 1994). Informal training may be 
even more important. Bishop (1991) estimates that only five to ten percent of worker training 
is formal training by training personnel. Most training is informal training watching others do 
the job, being shown how to do the job by a supervisor, or being helped by coworkers. Bishop 
estimates that for a new worker in small and medium sized firms, the cost of training during 
the first three months ranges from 25 percent to 60 percent of the trainee's potential output. 
This cost estimate includes the value of the training time devoted by training personnel, 
supervisors, co-workers, and the trainee.
2. Much of the training conducted by firms seems quite general. Many employers 
and workers state that the kind of training that is going on would be useful at other jobs. For 
example, Parsons (1990) reports that from 38 percent to 45 percent of young out-of-school 
male workers respond "very true" when asked whether "the skills you are learning would be 
valuable in getting a better job." There is also some evidence that training on one firms 
increases wages and productivity at other firms. Lynch (1992) finds that one year of off-the- 
job training with a previous employer increases wages with a subsequent employer by ten 
percent. Bishop (1994) estimates that formal-training on-the-job from a previous employer 
reduces time required for training by the current employer by 17 percent, and increases a 
worker's initial productivity on his/her new job by ten percent, but has no effect on current 
productivity (at the time of the interview). Bishop also estimates that off-the-job training on a 
previous job, while it has no effect on a worker's initial productivity on his/her new job, 
raises current productivity by 16 percent. One problem with all these estimates is that it is
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difficult to control for unobserved characteristics of individuals that might make them a
generally "better worker," which might both increase their wage and productivity on the 
current job and increase their probability of receiving some training in previous jobs.
3. There is little evidence that worker wages are reduced to implicitly finance the 
general training they receive. Even if firms finance general training, there need be no market 
failure if they are essentially acting as agents for their workers in a competitive market. In 
such an economic model, workers would accept lower initial wages with an employer in 
exchange for receiving general training, and then receive higher wages when their training is 
completed. Unfortunately for this theory, the research literature in general finds insignificant 
(Parsons, 1990) or significantly positive associations (Lynch, 1992) between the worker's 
current wage and current engagement in training. These estimates could be biased, for similar 
reasons to what was discussed above: higher quality workers may get more training and higher 
wages. Alternatively, perhaps there are efficiency wage considerations or institutional barriers 
that prevent wages from adjusting downwards so that workers can finance training.
4. It is difficult to distinguish between informal training on-the-job and the 
learning-by-doing that happens on the job. From a policy perspective, "firm-sponsored 
training" is some identifiable investment activity undertaken by the firm that requires the firm 
to make some explicit commitment of resources. Learning-by-doing simply happens due to the 
content of the job, and does not have any immediate obvious opportunity cost. Of course, 
firms may seek to design jobs in order to increase learning-by-doing, both in order to increase 
productivity of workers and to attract workers to the firm. But as a practical matter it would
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be impossible to separate out the "learning by doing" motivations for designing a job from
other motivations.
Parson's analysis above reveals the problem: are workers learning skills on the job due 
to training investments made by them or their employers, or simply in the normal course of 
their job duties? Bishop's analysis discussed above also discovers quite large effects of 
"relevant prior work experience" (as perceived by the firm) of a new employee, compared to 
"irrelevant work experience." Substituting ten years of relevant experience for ten years of 
irrelevant work experience is estimated by Bishop (1994) to raise a worker's productivity by 
33 percent when hired and 20 percent six months after hiring. Does more relevant work 
experience proxy for more training investments by previous employers, or does it simply 
reflect learning-by-doing?
5. Disadvantaged groups receive less firm-sponsored training than other groups. 
According to Tan (1989), 13 percent of male high school dropouts reported that they had 
received company sponsored or OJT to improve their skills on their current job, compared to 
32 percent of male college graduates. For females, 12 percent of high school dropouts receive 
company sponsored training or OJT to improve schools, versus 27 percent of college 
graduates. Across racial groups, only 15 percent of black males reported receiving company 
sponsored training or OJT to improve job skills, compared to 23 percent of white males. 
Nineteen percent of black females reported receiving such training, compared to 21 percent of 
white females. In addition, across different occupations, managers, professional, and technical 
employees are the most likely to receive company training (Lynch, 1990).
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6. Worker turnover rates are quite high, particularly the rates for younger workers 
and disadvantaged workers. For example, among male high school dropouts who were 
employed as of age 29, only 68 percent are in a job that will eventually last at least one year, 
compared to 89 percent of age 29 employed college graduates (Karoly and Klemran, 1994). 
For employed high school dropouts who are age 20, only 49 percent are in a job that will 
eventually last at least one year. In surveys of participants in Project Match, a welfare to work 
program in Chicago, 46 percent lost their first jobs obtained within three months, 60 percent 
within six months, and 73 percent within a year (Berg, Olson, and Conrad, 1991).
7. High worker turnover for disadvantaged workers seems to be closely related to 
poor work habits and problems with personal relationships with supervisors and co-workers. 
In focus groups conducted by the Upjohn Institute with employers of inner-city residents in
Kalamazoo, most employers felt that the number one problem preventing inner city residents
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from getting stable employment and escaping poverty was a "poor work ethic." Upon probing
focus group members, "poor work ethic" mostly seemed to consist of not showing up at work 
in a timely fashion, and conflicts with supervisors and co-workers.
In foliowup interviews to determine why Project Match participants lost their jobs, 
problems with timeliness or personal relationships at work often showed up as contributing 
causes. One restaurant manager commented on one of the Project Match participants "At the 
last minute he called in sick. Well, that set us all behind about an hour. And I was really, 
really mad at him because he didn't call-he had his girlfriend call in...which made me really 
mad. Because, I just, there's no reason for that." (Berg, Olson, and Conrad, 1991, p. 17) One 
Project Match participant, who quit a job as an office assistant, complained about being
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ordered about by a secretary with more seniority: "I just felt like she enjoyed bossing me 
around...! don't like people who press me all the time." (p. 19). Some Project Match 
participants lost jobs in part because of problems with co-workers: "A grocery store bagger 
got into a fist fight with a co-worker... One waitress was accused by her fellow waitresses of 
pocketing their tips. A dishwasher stopped coming to a job where he felt ignored an abused by 
restaurant staff and management. A restaurant manager said she fired one woman in part 
because she disrupted the rest of the staff." (p. 25)
Another study focused on why many graduates of New Chance, a training/employment 
program for young, high school drop-out welfare recipients, quit or were fired from jobs they 
obtained. (Quint, Musick, and Ladner, 1994). Again, timeliness and personal relationships 
showed up as key issues. One woman was given a week's suspension from her nursing home 
job because she was late because her boyfriend drug dealer was in jail and couldn't get the 
kids off to school for her. According to the authors of this study, "Delores resented her 
week's suspension and seemed to think that her supervisor should excuse her lateness because 
she believed she had a good reason for that lateness... She exemplifies this comment by one 
New Chance staff member: They [the program enrollees] think a good excuse for not doing 
something is as good as doing it.'" The authors go on to comment that "Many [New Chance 
participants], out of both idealism and naivete, seemed to think of the workplace as a 
democracy, with all employees being treated equally. They came to find instead that the 
workplace is characterized by hierarchical relationships, with different expectations and 
privileges attached to different positions on the organizational ladder. They also discovered 
that because they were at the bottom rung, they received the fewest perks. This was a common
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cause of resentment." The author's survey of participants found that conflict with a supervisor
was the most common reason reported for deciding to leave a job.
These problems impeding worker training have led to many government efforts over 
the years to increase training of the disadvantaged. Historically, most of these training 
programs have been "second chance" programs that attempt to help the disadvantaged after 
they have left school, from the Manpower Development and Training Act of the 1960s to the 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of the 1970s to the Job Training Partnership 
Act of the 1980s and 1990s. JTPA has received the most sophisticated evaluation, using 
random assignment to determine the effects of JTPA training (Bloom et al, 1994). The 
preliminary results of this evaluation reveal that JTPA seems to increase adult woman's 
earnings by around 17 percent ($847 per year) in months 19-30 after entering training, and 
increases adult men's earnings by around 11 percent ($856 per year). The effects of training 
appear to be greater for "on-the-job training" (OJT) and job search assistance than for 
classroom training. OJT involves local JTPA agencies paying wage subsidies to employers 
who agree to hire JTPA participants and provide training. On the other hand, JTPA does not 
have any significant positive effects for youth. This is consistent with other studies of job 
training programs for youth, which generally fail to find significant positive effects.
Given all this information, policymakers face some very difficult dilemmas. There is 
clearly a case that firms may not have the proper incentives to provide sufficient general 
training to disadvantaged workers. Firm training appears to be productive on a variety of jobs, 
but worker turnover among the disadvantaged is high and the disadvantaged receive less 
training. On the other hand, some of the most valuable training seems to be difficult to
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distinguish, if it is distinguishable at all, simply from work experience. This makes it difficult 
to fund this training without running the danger of providing huge subsidies to all kinds of 
firms who might have hired disadvantaged workers anyway. Finally, at least some of the 
disadvantaged need "job skills" that amount to socialization skills. Firms are probably not well 
equipped to have the tolerance necessary to impart these skills. On the other hand, schools and 
families are apparently not doing a good enough job with some disadvantaged persons of 
imparting these skills either.
These dilemmas, and the poor record of youth "Second Chance" training programs, 
have led to increased interest in a wide variety of "school-to-work" programs. These programs 
seek to make school training more relevant to the needs of employers, by involving employers 
in program design, and by incorporating work experience into the school day. These programs 
also seek to teach students a "work ethic." As of yet, there is no really hard evidence on these 
programs' effectiveness.
6. Conclusion
There is significant evidence that in some cases, social intervention can make a 
permanent difference to the employment and earnings prospects of the poor: it is possible to 
teach people to fish. There is fairly good evidence that inadequate employment opportunities, 
discrimination, poor employer information, and problems with the human capital of the poor 
are all factors that impede moving the poor into a higher earnings and employment life course. 
What we lack is adequate knowledge of what programs can deal with these problems in a cost- 
effective way.
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Beyond the issue of whether a specific program works for a particular group of
persons, there is the issue of the macro or aggregate effects of employment-oriented problems 
of the poor. If a program increases the job skills or employment opportunities of one group of 
disadvantaged persons, what does this do to the job prospects of other participants in the labor 
market? What is the impact of this program on wage rates and inflation rates? We have 
virtually no evidence on these crucial issues.
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